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I. INTRODUCTION
Two centuries ago, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that “[w]here
the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes
everything from which aid can be derived.”1 Yet for more than half a
century, Congress has forbidden judges to use the evidence before their
own eyes when interpreting the federal Judicial Code. In what will
come as a surprise to most readers, Congress has directed judges to
ignore the plainly visible structure of logically organized parts and
* Orestes A. Brownson Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minnesota). For valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article that
strengthened the analysis, but retaining full responsibility for substance of the final version, the
author thanks Judith Resnik, Kevin Clermont, David Shapiro, Thomas Mengler, Philip Frickey,
and Jay Tidmarsh.
1. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358, 386 (1805).
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chapters with their identifying headings into which statutory sections
have been placed through the 1948 enactment of Title 28 of the United
States Code.2
In an uncodified provision, Congress instructed that “[n]o inference
of a legislative construction is to be drawn” by the location of a section
in a particular chapter in Title 28 nor by the “catchlines” for parts,
chapters, and sections.3 Thus, this little-known and half-hidden section
casts the the Judicial Code’s brightly-lit profile into jurisprudential
darkness.
In the sculptures and statues that ornament our courthouses, the
Roman goddess Justicia often is portrayed with the sword of justice in
one hand, the scales for weighing just deserts in the other hand, and a
blindfold across her eyes symbolizing her lack of preferential favor for
any person.4 While blindfolded to ward against the corruption of
personal partiality,5 the assumption remains that Lady Justice can still
see the law clearly with the eyes of the mind. But when abstruse
legislation clouds the legal mind,6 Lady Justice must lift her blindfold
so that the visible contours of the law come into sharper relief.7
Sixty years of legislatively-imposed blindness on the federal
judiciary is more than enough. The time has long since passed to retire
this mischievous provision, to introduce transparency to the
interpretation of the provisions collected in Title 28, and to let the light
shine upon the federal Judicial Code’s carefully designed structure.

2. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (revising and codifying Title 28). See
also infra Part II.
3. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991.
4. See Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1727, 1755
(1987). This familiar icon of Justice—“the oddly dressed woman with a set of attributes (scales,
sword, and sometimes a blindfold)”—dates to the medieval and Renaissance periods. Judith
Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to TwentyFirst Century Courthouses, 151 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 139, 143–45 (2007). Beginning with
Babylonian iconography, “one can trace Justice’s roots through goddesses both Greek and
Roman, from Themis and Dike to Iusitia,” and into Christian representations in the Middle Ages
of the Virtues. Id. As Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis conclude in their study of the symbol, this
particular image of Justice has achieved near-universal recognition and has enjoyed remarkable
durability because “it has been deployed, politically, by governments seeking to link their rules
and judgments to her legitimacy.” Id. at 145.
5. Although understood today to “suggest[] judgment uncorrupted,” placing a blindfold
on an image of Justice during the Renaissance often carried “negative connotations,” such as
Justice’s eyes being “bandaged to keep her from having to see the pain caused by the sanctions
imposed in the name of the law,” the eyes being covered to communicate “the pain of
judgment,” or Justice being blindfolded by a fool to lead her “astray.” Resnik & Curtis, supra
note 4, at 160–64. In more recent times, the blindfold has come to be commonly used as a
celebrated attribute of the icon. Id. at 163.
6. See infra Parts III & IV.
7. See infra Parts V & VI.
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II. INTERPRETING STATUTES IN CONTEXT AND THE 1948 STRUCTURAL
REVISION OF THE JUDICIAL CODE
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.”8 William Eskridge and Philip Frickey
describe “the main lines of textual inquiry” as including consideration
of “how the statutory provision at issue coheres with the general
structure of the statute.”9 Given that statutory provisions typically are
organized into separately-named parts and chapters within a particular
legislative act or as codified within a title of the United States Code, the
location of a particular statutory section within the broader structure of a
legislative enactment may communicate essential information about
how that section should be understood.10
The importance of structure may be especially evident when the
interpretive question focuses on the basic nature of a provision, such as
whether it states a jurisdictional, substantive, or procedural rule.
Divining the essential nature of a statutory rule may be critical or
dispositive to the outcome of a lawsuit. When a provision is embedded
into jurisdictional bedrock, for example, the parties are deprived of the
ability to decide which issues to litigate and which to waive or forfeit,
the court assumes the burden to raise the matter sua sponte, and both the
court and the parties may be prevented from reaching the merits.11
Regarding the salience of structure on such a question, consider Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,12 in which the Supreme Court held that the
timely filing of an employment discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission was not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court. The Court observed that the
provision actually granting the court jurisdiction “contains no reference
to the timely-filing requirement,” while the provision setting the time
limitation appears as an entirely separate section of the legislation.13

8. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 545–46 (2002).
9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354–44 (1990); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 449 (1988) (explaining that the conclusion that certain civilian employment matters are not
subject to judicial review under the Civil Service Reform Act or otherwise “emerges not only
from the statutory language, but also from . . . the structure of the statutory scheme”).
10. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2008)
(“find[ing] it informative that Congress placed” a statutory section within a particularly labeled
subchapter).
11. See infra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
12. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
13. Id. at 383–94; see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (“[W]hen
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”).
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The central place of structure in statutory construction may be a
noteworthy common ground in the ongoing debate over methods of
interpretation. Textualists, who are more likely to find “that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship
with other laws,”14 may give greatest weight to structural context within
a codified title. At the same time, those advocating alternative
approaches to ascertaining or reconstructing legislative intent will also
find salient evidence in the purposeful structure of a code.
Intentionalists, moreover, will take note of statements in the legislative
history behind a revision and codification of a set of laws that
emphasize the importance that Congress attached to the coherent
arrangement of chapters and sections.15
For the federal judiciary, the rules of the adjudicative game—the
organization of the courts, jurisdiction and venue, procedure, and
adoption of court rules—are to be found in various provisions of the
Judicial Code, codified today in Title 28 of the United States Code. Any
particular section addressing these court-related matters ideally should
be interpreted so that it “fit[s] harmoniously within a set of provisions
composing a coherent chapter of the Judicial Procedure part of the
United States Code.”16 And, indeed, Congress adopted a careful and
deliberate organization for Title 28 that should facilitate judicial
interpretation. But the work of the code revisers and the action of
Congress in enacting that meticulously designed structure appears to be
of little avail in terms of judicial interpretation—a disappointing
postscript to the 1948 codification.17
Prior to 1948, Title 28 of the United States Code had not been
enacted as an integrated statute and thus served only as prima facie
evidence of the law, making it necessary for lawyers and judges “to
14. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 521.
15. William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett question whether, in light of
the less than “single-minded” nature of “actual legislative practice,” the “whole act rule,” by
which a statutory provision is interpreted in a “holistic” manner within a statutory scheme, is
consistent with an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 263
(2000). Nonetheless, they conclude that “on rule of law grounds,” “there might be greater legal
legitimacy, as well as aesthetic advantage, if courts presume coherence among statutes as well
as within statutes.” Id. at 264. In addition, when Congress passes a revision and codification of a
title within the United States Code, there may be a stronger basis for believing that the
integrated whole accurately reflects collective legislative intent. As confirmed by the history of
the 1948 code revision that is sketched in the following text, when Congress undertakes to
specifically revise and codify an entire Title, it is acting with unique, specific, and common
intent to create that very “coherence among statutes.” See id.
16. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 136 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (discussing appellate review of remand orders in removed cases).
17. See infra notes 22–37 and accompanying text.
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refer back to the Judicial Code of 1911 and to later volumes of the
Statutes at Large in order to determine the exact text of any statutory
provision.”18 In 1948, to address this unsatisfactory state of affairs and
to bring the law up to date, Congress enacted the revised and
reorganized provisions of the Judicial Code into positive law, through
the codification of Title 28 of the United States Code.19
Regarding the project to revise and codify Title 28, which
culminated in the 1948 Act, the Supreme Court said:
This was scarcely hasty, ill-considered legislation. To the
contrary, it received close and prolonged study. Five years
of Congressional attention supports the Code. And from the
start, Congress obtained the most eminent expert assistance
available. The spadework was entrusted to two law-bookpublishing firms, the staffs of which had unique experience
in statutory codification and revision. They formed an
advisory committee, including distinguished judges and
members of the bar, and obtained the services of special
consultants. Furthermore, an advisory committee was
appointed by the Judicial Conference. And to assist with
matters relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, Chief
Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consisting
of himself and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas.20
The textual framework of the Title 28 revision and codification was
a clear, meaningful, and deliberately-constructed structure upon which
judges, lawyers, and ordinary citizens could rely. Congress’s
conscientious purpose in classifying statutes within the Judicial Code’s
various parts, chapters, and subchapters is plainly stated in the House
Report on the legislation:
The first step in revision was the preparation of a
preliminary analysis—the framework upon which to build
the new title. In drafting this outline the old system of
classification was discarded and modern subject matter
arrangement was substituted. The material was divided into
six major categories. Part I provides for organization of
courts; part II treats of the attorneys and marshals; part III
covers court officers and employees; part IV sets forth the
18. Alexander Holtzoff, The New Federal Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 343, 343–44 (194849).
19. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869. For a history of the enactment of the
federal Judicial Code in Title 28, see generally 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER,
EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3509 (2007);
Holtzoff, supra note 18.
20. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1949).
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provisions on jurisdiction and venue; part V deals with
procedure; and part VI takes up particular proceedings.
Within these parts, the subject matter was arranged
under appropriate chapter heads. The numbering system
adopted makes adequate provision for future legislation.
Chapters were given odd numbers, leaving the even
numbers available for related chapters containing future
acts. Sufficient section numbers were left between chapters
to accommodate such growth.21
Unfortunately, while winding up the meticulous process of enacting
the revision of Title 28, Congress apparently lost its nerve and was
unwilling to allow these deliberate choices to be recognized by the
courts as reflecting actual legislative intent. In a little-known and
uncodified provision of the 1948 legislation, Congress precluded the
courts from drawing a direct inference of legislative intent from the fact
that a particular statutory section was classified within a certain chapter
of Title 28 under a specific descriptive heading. Section 33 of the 1948
Revision of Title 28 reads: “No inference of a legislative construction is
to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any section is
placed, nor by reason of the catchlines used in such title.”22

21. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 5 (1947).
22. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991. A nearly identical uncodified
provision applies to Title 18, the federal criminal code, which was revised and codified as part
of the same 1948 Act. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (“No inference of a
legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 18, Crimes and Criminal
Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any particular section is placed, nor by
reason of the catchlines used in such title.”). Similar language, reciting that no inference of a
legislative construction is to be drawn from the placement of a section into a chapter or within
the United States Code or from the caption or catchline of a provision, has been enacted as well
with respect to the codification of other titles of the United States Code, including Title 13
(Census), Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1158, § 5, 68 Stat. 1024; Title 14 (Coast Guard), Act of
Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 393, § 3, 63 Stat. 557; Title 26 (Internal Revenue Code), 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b)
(2006); Title 31 (Money and Finance), Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 4(e), 96 Stat. 877, 1067 (1982);
Title 36 (Patriotic and National Observances, Ceremonies, and Organizations), Pub. L. No. 105225, § 5(e), 112 Stat. 1253, 1499 (1998); Title 39 (Postal Service), Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 11(b),
84 Stat. 719, 785 (1970); Title 40 (Public Buildings, Property, and Works), Pub. L. No. 107217, § 5(f), 116 Stat. 1062, 1304 (2002); and Title 44 (Public Printing and Documents), Pub. L.
No. 90-620, § 2(e), 82 Stat. 1238, 1306 (1968). While largely hidden provisions erasing the
significance of the deliberately-enacted structure of a code in construing its provisions strike me
as equally pernicious elsewhere in the law, my lack of expertise in fields such as criminal law
and tax causes me to hesitate from proposing a repeal of these similar blindness directives.
Making the case for unveiling the structure of Title 28 for forthright use in judicial interpretation
is sufficient work for one article. Most importantly, as addressed above in the text, one of the
most distinctive features and crowning achievements of the codification of Title 28 was its
structure and classification of provisions into designated parts and chapters.
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By enacting the § 33 codicil to the revision and codification of Title
28, Congress perhaps wished to avoid inadvertent changes in law.23 To
be sure, in general, the 1948 revision legislation was designed to clarify,
simplify, and harmonize statutory provisions governing the judiciary
rather than to make substantive changes in the law.24 But while “the
majority of the provisions of the Code constitute restatements of
existing law, as is generally true of most codifications,” the Judicial
Code revisers deliberately introduced “[a] number of changes in the
law,” some of which were understood to be of “considerable
consequence.”25 Major substantive changes in the Title 28 revisions
enacted in 1948 included new provisions defining diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction to include suits between citizens of the District
of Columbia and citizens of different states, granting authority to district
courts to transfer venue, directing that petitions for removal of cases
from state to federal court are to be filed only in the federal court, and
setting a uniform period for filing a notice of appeal in civil cases.26
And among those revisions to the Judicial Code in which the drafters
took special pride was the careful classification of jurisdictional,
substantive, procedural, and other provisions into designated parts and
chapters.27 “[F]ar from being a random collection of provisions,” the
organization of Title 28 was by conscious and scrupulous design.28
23. Beyond reciting that the section “provides against any inference of a legislative
construction by reason of the classification of any section in a particular chapter or by reason of
the captions or catch lines used throughout the title,” the legislative history sheds no light on the
congressional purpose behind adoption of this veiling provision. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 7
(1947).
24. See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 279 (2003) (“The legislative history described revisions of
Title 28 in general as stylistic rather than substantive, aimed at ending needless searches into the
Statutes at Large, eliminating anachronistic provisions, and simplifying language.”).
25. Holtzoff, supra note 18, at 345.
26. William W. Barron, The Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 439, 441–43 (1949) (quoting
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19 (1924)).
27. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and
H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 44 (1947)
(statement of John F. X. Finn, former special counsel to the House Committee on Revision of
the Laws) (stating that he was “proudest of the way this proposed code deals with jurisdiction,
venue, removal of causes, full faith and credit, and evidence and procedure”); see also Holtzoff,
supra note 18, at 344–45 (describing the revised Judicial Code “[i]n its arrangement” as being
“a considerable improvement on its predecessor”); Albert B. Maris, New Federal Judicial Code:
Enactment by 80th Congress a Notable Gain, 34 A.B.A. J. 863, 864 (1948) (saying that “the
revisers have been particularly successful in arranging, in a logical and consistent way, the
statutory material which remains in force”). For further discussion of the deliberate structural
changes introduced into the Judicial Code, see also infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
28. Susan S. McDonald, A Case of Statutory Misinterpretation: An 1839 Statute of
Limitation on a Form of Debt Action is Being Misapplied to Limit Modern Regulatory
Proceedings, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 659, 673 (2000).
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Moreover, by this “regrouping of sections,” Congress was able to
compare and reconcile “inconsistent or conflicting provisions that
otherwise might pass unnoticed.”29
William W. Barron, the chief reviser, explained that the Title 28
revision brought about
a consolidation of varied and scattered sections pertaining
to similar subject matter, a logical, orderly grouping of
related principles. While no change was made for the sake
of change, we have made the effort, in the words of
[Justice] Cardozo, “to reckon our gains and losses, strike a
balance and start afresh.”30
Importantly, notwithstanding § 33, Congress affirmatively enacted the
revised Title 28 as an integrated whole—complete with parts, chapters,
and subchapters—and thereby embedded a restructured Judicial Code
into positive law.31
Moreover, concerns about reading too much meaning into the
structure of a revised and codified Title should be alleviated by the
general presumption that changes made during a codification are for
purposes of clarification, unless clear indication is present that a change
in meaning was intended.32 To say that an inference of legislative intent
may legitimately be drawn from the structure of a code is not to say that
such an inference will in every case outweigh other textual and
contextual indicia of statutory meaning.33
In this respect, the primary information conveyed with clarity by the
choice of organization within a code concerns the basic nature of a
provision rather than its precise meaning in application.34 Thus,
classification of a section within a particular chapter does say something
important, but it does not say everything or even most things about a
29. Barron, supra note 26, at 440.
30. Id. at 446 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 26, at 19).
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209 (1993) (saying about the
“comprehensive revision of the Judicial Code completed in 1948, we do not presume that the
revision worked a change in the underlying substantive law ‘unless an intent to make such [a]
chang[e] is clearly expressed’” (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S.
222, 227 (1957))); Anderson v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1912) (“The change
of arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section in two separated
sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. For it will not be
inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect
unless such intention is clearly expressed.”); see generally 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28:11, at 493 (5th ed.) (noting the presumption that a change in
language “is for purposes of clarity rather than for a change in meaning”).
33. See infra Part VI.
34. See infra Part III.
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provision.35 And placement within a particular chapter certainly
suggests nothing that may contradict the plain operating language of the
section or that would preclude simultaneous and careful consideration
by a court of the legislative history, contemporary legal understanding,
and other commonly-invoked sources and canons regarding the
meaning of a particular statutory provision.
That consideration of structure, like every other rule or canon of
statutory construction, is a tool of limited application is no reason to
require a court to leave it in the tool-box when structure may be a useful
guide to statutory understanding.36 By directing the courts not to give
any meaning to parts, chapters, and catchlines, § 33 prevents courts
from making a complete examination of a statutory section within the
Judicial Code and from deriving every piece of information necessary to
give faithful meaning to the enacted text.37
III. UNJUST AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS WHEN THE JUDICIARY IS
SUPPOSEDLY BLINDED TO STATUTORY STRUCTURE: TWO CASE
EXAMPLES
Although § 33 of the 1948 Act codifying the Judicial Code38 remains
in force and has present-day practical effect,39 judges and lawyers have
little awareness of this disruption to the ordinary practice of statutory
interpretation.40 In the sixty years since the 1948 revision of Title 28,
this uncodified constraint on judicial interpretation has been cited on
only five occasions by federal courts at all levels—none later than 1958
and only once by the Supreme Court.41
In the single case in which the Supreme Court remarked on this
provision, the structure of Title 28 would not have played a meaningful
role in the Court’s decision, even if it had been adduced as evidence of
legislative intent. In Ex parte Collett,42 the Court rejected the suggestion
that the venue transfer statute applies only to civil suits for which
special venue requirements were set out in neighboring provisions
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2008)
(saying that while “a subchapter heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute,”
that “[n]onetheless, statutory titles and section headings ‘are tools available for the resolution of
a doubt about the meaning of a statute’” (citation omitted)).
37. See infra Part V.
38. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991.
39. See infra Part III.A–B.
40. See infra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
41. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 59 (1949); Steckel v. Lurie, 185 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir.
1950); Hernandez v. Watson Bros. Trans. Co., 165 F. Supp. 720, 721 (D. Colo. 1958); Du Roure
v. Alvord, 120 F. Supp. 166, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Boye v. United States, No. 07-195C, 2009
WL 3824371, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 12, 2009).
42. 337 U.S. 55 (1949).
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within the venue chapter of the Judicial Code.43 The Court mentioned
§ 33 as disqualifying any argument based on placement of the venue
transfer statute in this chapter.44 Nevertheless, the Court observed that
the plain language of the statute, which authorizes transfer of “any civil
action,” as well as the fact that other venue provisions in the chapter
obviously apply generally to ordinary civil lawsuits, directed the
result.45 Thus, even if evidence of structure had been admissible, it
simply had little relevance in that case.
Unfortunately, the parsity of citations to § 33 does not necessarily
mean its practical effect is feeble. First, because a court may silently
defer to § 33, the court may thereby dodge the question of whether the
outcome would have been different had the court conscientiously
interpreted the governing statutory provision within its structural
context. While at least one case example of apparent avoidance is
described below,46 we can never know on how many other occasions a
statutory provision has been given an a-contextual and arguably
mistaken reading because a federal court gave mute ascension to the
congressional directive to ignore the structure of the Judicial Code.
Second, whether by quiet circumvention or blissful ignorance, a court
may interpret a section of the Judicial Code in a manner consistent with
and informed by its structure, without ever acknowledging the contrary
instruction of § 33.47 Unless the court references the Judicial Code
framework by chapter and verse, the reader may not be certain whether
structure played a crucial interpretive role in the outcome or whether the
consistency of the judicial treatment of the section with that structure
was serendipitous.
That courts may sometimes depart from the command of § 33 and
take the structure of the Judicial Code into account, while courts on
other occasions may adhere to its confining injunction and refuse to
consider structure, leaves litigants to the vagaries and injustice of
discordant and capricious results. That questions implicating structure
under the Judicial Code frequently involve jurisdictional versus
procedural classifications means that an a-contextual interpretation may
deprive a party of a federal forum or otherwise result in dismissal of a
claim.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 58–59 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006)).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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A. Declining to Respect the Codification of the Statute of
Limitations for the Court of Federal Claims in a
Non-Jurisdictional Chapter
The baneful effect of the blinding of the judiciary to manifest
structural context within the Judicial Code was felt rather sharply in the
Supreme Court’s recent 2008 decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States.48 As I have written previously, the John R. Sand case
presented
a question that seemingly only a lawyer could love (or care
about): whether the statute of limitations governing nontort money claims against the federal government in the
United States Court of Federal Claims is jurisdictional. In
other words, is this an ordinary statute of limitations, that
is, an affirmative defense and a procedural time constraint
that may be waived or forfeited by the government? Or is
this instead a special and absolute rule of subject matter
jurisdiction, one that cannot be relinquished and indeed that
must be raised by the court on its own motion, even if both
the claimant and the government agree that the lawsuit was
timely filed?49
Yet the answer to the question of jurisdictionality in John R. Sand
was anything but esoteric and abstract in its consequence. Categorizing
a provision as jurisdictional or not determines whether the parties
maintain control over what issues they choose to litigate, or instead
whether a matter must be raised by the court sua sponte at each stage of
the litigation, which in turn may mean that a decision on the merits may
later be vacated, even if the parties had agreed that an element was
satisfied.50 Moreover, the Supreme Court generally presumes that
procedural rules in federal government cases, including the application
of statutes of limitations to statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, are
to be applied in the same manner as with private litigants.51 But if what

48. 552 U.S. 130 (2008). In the interests of full disclosure and because work on the case
resulted in my first and consequential encounter with § 33, see infra notes 154–55 and
accompanying text, I was co-counsel for the petitioner before the Supreme Court in this case.
49. Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 521 (2008).
50. See also infra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93–96 (1990) (holding that
the limitations period on employment discrimination claims against the United States is subject
to equitable tolling in the same manner as in cases among private litigants); Henderson v. United
States, 517 U.S. 654, 663–71 (1996) (holding that service of process for claims against the
federal government under the Suits in Admiralty Act may be accomplished under ordinary
service provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding a stricter
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appeared to be a procedural or case-processing rule is instead
designated as jurisdictional, the general presumption of procedural
custom is thereby rebutted.
The petitioner in John R. Sand was not without forceful arguments
against a jurisdictional reading of the statute of limitations at issue in
that case.52 The statute of limitations for non-tort money claims in the
United States Court of Federal Claims is found in § 2501 of Title 28 of
the United States Code: “Every claim of which the United States Court
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”53 The
plain language suggests that the jurisdictional inquiry is to be separately
completed before application of the time limitation. Jurisdiction is
assumed in the first phrase of § 2501, before the time bar is set forth in
the second phrase.54 When the predecessor statute was enacted in 1863,
the legislative history indicated that members of Congress expected this
statute of limitations to apply to the government in the same manner as
to private parties.55 The contemporary legal understanding at the time of
enactment was that a statute of limitations was a waivable defense.56
requirement under the statute). On application of procedural rules in federal government cases,
see generally Sisk, supra note 49, at 580–87.
52. See generally Sisk, supra note 49, at 587–94 (developing in detail the arguments
against characterization of § 2501 as jurisdictional).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006).
54. See Grass Valley Terrace v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 341, 347 (2005) (referring to
this understanding as the “plain English interpretation of the statute”); see also John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“The text of the statute confirms that the limitations period is applied to claims of which the
Court of Federal Claims already ‘has jurisdiction’”), aff’d, 552 U.S. 130 (2008); Howard
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1547, 1550 (2008) (saying that “properly read, [§ 2501] addresses the time for bringing
claims and not the jurisdiction of the Court of [Federal] Claims”).
55. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 414 (1863) (statement of Sen. Sherman)
(“As this bill proposes to throw open this court to all claimants, I think the same statute of
limitations ought to be applied to existing claims as would be applied between private
individuals.”); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1860) (statement of Sen. Bayard)
(justifying the inclusion of a statute of limitations “because there can be no reason whatever for
acts of limitation as between citizen and citizen, . . . which does not apply as between
Government and citizen”). Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the statute of
limitations was intended to be jurisdictional in nature.
56. During the period when the 1863 statute of limitations was enacted, statutes of
limitations were understood to affect the remedy and not the underlying right of action.
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 624–29 (1885); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407,
413 (1850); M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327–28 (1839). See generally JOSEPH
K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY AND
ADMIRALTY § 22, at 17 (4th ed. 1861). A statute of limitations thus has been a classic example
of an affirmative defense left to the defendant to raise and establish and subject to waiver or
forfeiture. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (listing “statute of limitations” as among the “affirmative
defenses” that a defendant “must affirmatively state”); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205
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Congress had selected language from typical state statutes of limitations
of this mid-nineteenth-century period, thus drafting § 2501 to be what
the Supreme Court later called an “unexceptional” statute of
limitations.57
Indeed, in deciding the John R. Sand case, the Supreme Court
disagreed with none of these points on their merits. Nonetheless, the
Court ruled that the statute of limitations did have jurisdictional force,
thus requiring a court to “raise on its own the timeliness of a lawsuit
filed in the Court of Federal Claims, despite the Government’s waiver
of the issue.”58 The Court’s decision was premised squarely and
exclusively on stare decisis,59 adhering to a nineteenth century line of
cases60 from a very early stage in the Court’s sovereign immunity
jurisprudence that reflected a rigid jurisdictional attitude toward thennovel legislation that afforded a general judicial remedy against the
federal government for monetary claims.61 Two Justices dissented,
agreeing both that the jurisdictional rule reaffirmed by the majority had
been expressly abandoned in prior decisions and that any ambiguity in
the case-law “ought to be resolved in favor of clarifying the law, rather
than preserving an anachronism whose doctrinal underpinnings were
discarded years ago.”62
Due to § 33, the petitioner in John R. Sand was deprived of effective
use of yet another powerful argument against implying jurisdiction into
a statute of limitations, one based directly upon the structure of Title 28.
Because the 1948 revision and codification of Title 28 post-dated the
Court’s nineteenth century detour into jurisdictional analysis, this
renewed legislative attention should have provided a basis for bringing

(2006) (“A statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no
obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.”); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,
393 (1982) (stating that, rather than being “a jurisdictional prerequisite,” “a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”).
57. See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 145 (2002) (declaring
unanimously—after re-examining the text and historical context of the predecessor statute—that
§ 2501 is an “unexceptional” statute of limitations, comparable in text to “[a] number of
contemporaneous [nineteenth century] state statutes of limitations applicable to suits between
private parties”).
58. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008).
59. Id. at 132–40.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48, 50, 52 (1898) (declaring that the
statute of limitations for the Court of Claims was “not merely a statute of limitations but also
jurisdictional in its nature,” although the jurisdictional question was not presented because the
government was openly challenging the timeliness of the action in the courts); Kendall v. United
States, 107 U.S. 123, 124–25 (1883).
61. See Sisk, supra note 49, at 550–52, 592–94.
62. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 140–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the case law back onto the original path set by Congress.63 Section 33,
however, drained persuasive force away from this structural argument.
When we examine the jurisdictional and procedural statutes
applicable to the Court of Federal Claims by how they were classified
into specific statutory parts and chapters by Congress in the 1948
codification of Title 28, the structural framework of the Judicial Code
strongly suggests that the statute of limitations did not limit the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court.
In its revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, Congress
reserved the fourth part for provisions on federal courts jurisdiction and
venue: “Part IV—Jurisdiction and Venue.” Chapter 91 of that part,
titled “United States Court of Federal Claims,” now contains sixteen
sections expressly defining and limiting the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Nearly all the sections in Chapter 91 speak forthrightly in
the language of “jurisdiction.”64 Thus, when Congress wishes to grant
or withhold “jurisdiction” from the Court of Federal Claims, its choice
of both text and code classification in this chapter of Title 28 shows that
it knows how to do so in the most distinctive terms and by clear
structural organization.
63. As part of the 1948 Act, a slight change was made in the language of the statute of
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, substituting the words “has jurisdiction” for “cognizable by” in
describing the claims falling within the authority of the Court of Federal Claims. The 1863
predecessor statute read: “[E]very claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of
claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed
in the court or transmitted to it under the provisions of this act within six years after the claim
first accrues.” Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767. As currently codified, the
statute speaks of the Court of Federal Claims as having “jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006).
The word “cognizable” means “‘within [the] jurisdiction of [a] court or power given to [a] court
to adjudicate [a] controversy.’” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1990)). In John R. Sand & Gravel Co., the Court said that it
would not presume this revision worked a change in the substantive law without a clear
expression by Congress. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 134–36 (majority opinion). As
neither party suggested that “has jurisdiction” and “cognizable by” were anything other than
synonymous, the Court unsurprisingly found “no such expression of intent here[]” to change the
meaning based solely on its text. Id. at 136. By contrast, after briefing by the parties regarding
§ 33, the Court chose not to address the classification of the statute of limitations into a
procedural chapter in the 1948 revision.
64. Most of the sections in this chapter state that “[t]he United States Court of Federal
Claims shall have jurisdiction” over a defined claim or set of claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1494–
97, 1499, 1503, 1505, 1507–08. A few sections state that “[t]he United States Court of Federal
Claims shall not have jurisdiction” over a defined set of other claims. Id. §§ 1500–02, 1509.
There are only two exceptions to this pattern of language expressly granting or withholding
“jurisdiction.” First, the unique provision for congressional reference of claims to the Court of
Federal Claims, id. § 1492, does not speak in jurisdictional terms because it does not grant
jurisdiction as such. Second, the provision waiving sovereign immunity for claims alleging
infringement of patents and copyrights by the United States, id. § 1498, confers jurisdiction by
creating an exclusive action in the Court of Federal Claims.
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By contrast, § 2501,65 as the general statute of limitations for claims
before the Court of Federal Claims, is codified in a separate part of Title
28 titled “Part VI—Particular Proceedings” and in Chapter 165 titled
“United States Court of Federal Claims Procedure.” In addition to
setting the time for filing suit, the sections in this chapter address such
procedural, non-jurisdictional matters as aliens’ privilege to sue;66
appearance of parties before the court, presentation of evidence,
examination of witnesses, rules of practice and procedure, and holding
trials;67 the qualifications of witnesses;68 discovery;69 new trials and
stays of judgment;70 payment of judgments;71 and the conclusiveness of
judgments.72 None of the provisions in Chapter 165 speak in the
language of “jurisdiction”—except to confirm the court’s previous
exercise of or the availability of subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim to which the court is to apply the procedural rule.73
Accordingly, the designation of § 2501 within a procedural chapter
as enacted by Congress in the 1948 revision should have confirmed that
this was indeed an ordinary and unexceptional statute of limitations that
should be construed and applied according to common legal standards.
Even the government, in its brief before the Supreme Court in John R.
Sand, acknowledged that given the deliberate structural arrangement of
Title 28, it is likely that the 1948 code “revisers did not understand the
preexisting six-year filing requirement to be a limit on the Court of
Claims’ jurisdiction.”74
But none of that mattered. Through § 33, Congress had effectively
instructed the courts to ignore this organization and classification. And
the Supreme Court apparently obliged.

65. Id. § 2501.
66. Id. § 2502.
67. Id. § 2503.
68. Id. § 2506.
69. Id. § 2507.
70. Id. § 2515.
71. Id. § 2517.
72. Id. § 2519.
73. See id. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues.”) (emphasis added); id. § 2502(a) (“Citizens or subjects of any foreign government
which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their
government in its courts may sue the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims
if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court’s jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added);
id. § 2510(a) (“The Comptroller General may transmit to the United States Court of Federal
Claims for trial and adjudication any claim or matter of which the Court of Federal Claims
might take jurisdiction . . . .”) (emphasis added).
74. Brief for the United States at 34, John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130 (2008)
(No. 06-1164).
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B. Honoring the Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional
Classification of Statutory Sections in the Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)75 is the most comprehensive
and commonly invoked waiver of federal sovereign immunity for tort
claims against the federal government.76 Under the FTCA, the United
States is liable on the same basis and to the same extent as recovery
would be allowed for a tort committed under like circumstances by a
private person in that state.77
While the FTCA waives the federal sovereign immunity for tort
claims generally, the United States remains the beneficiary of several
special rules and protections, notably including: restrictions on the
standards of liability (such as the exclusion of strict liability);78
numerous defined exceptions to liability that bar certain types of claims
(such as claims for assault, libel, misrepresentation, and interference
with contract)79 or that preclude liability arising out of certain
governmental activities (including discretionary or policymaking
functions,80 transmission of mail,81 and military combat);82 restrictions
on damages available (precluding prejudgment interest and punitive
damages);83 and the exclusion of certain categories of people from
eligibility to seek a damages remedy under the FTCA (federal civilian
employees covered by a compensation act84 and military service
members injured incident to service).85
In FDIC v. Meyer,86 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Federal Tort Claims Act superseded another statute that generally
permits a particular agency to sue and be sued. By express statutory
directive, the FTCA is the exclusive venue for suits against agencies
that are authorized to sue and be sued in their own name if the claim is

75. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2006).
76. GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 3.02, at 104 (4th ed.
2006).
77. United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005).
78. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 797–803 (1972) (construing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1), making the government liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of
any government employee, as encompassing only fault-based causes of action, such as
negligence or intentional wrongdoing).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
80. Id. § 2680(a).
81. Id. § 2680(c).
82. Id. § 2680(j).
83. Id. § 2674.
84. Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2006).
85. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–46 (1950) (holding that claims by
military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service should be excluded from the FTCA).
86. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
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“cognizable” under the FTCA.87 Defining “cognizable” as meaning that
a claim is within the adjudicative authority of a court, the Court ruled
that the “inquiry focuses on the jurisdictional grant provided by
§ 1346(b).”88
Subsection 1346(b) not only speaks in the language of jurisdiction
but also is codified in Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code, which bears the
legend “District Courts; Jurisdiction.” Focusing on this section, the
Supreme Court in Meyer described the jurisdictional directions for
FTCA claims:
Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts
jurisdiction over a certain category of claims for which the
United States has waived its sovereign immunity and
“render[ed]” itself liable. This category includes claims that
are:
“[1] against the United States, [2] for money
damages, . . . [3] for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government [5] while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, [6] under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b).
A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant—
and thus is “cognizable” under § 1346(b)—if it is
actionable under § 1346(b). And a claim is
actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six
elements outlined above.89
Accordingly, as confirmed by its jurisdictional language and its
location within a jurisdictional chapter of the Judicial Code, § 1346(b)
demarks the jurisdictional compass of federal court authority over tort
claims against the United States, setting forth six requisite jurisdictional
elements. Thus, for example, whether a government employee was
“acting within the scope of his . . . employment,” and whether the
“circumstances” are such that a “private person” would be liable are

87. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a).
88. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476.
89. 510 U.S. at 477 (citations omitted); see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
140–41 (1950) (describing § 1346(b) as conferring jurisdiction, while regarding other provisions
in the FTCA as prescribing what claims are allowable, to be determined by courts in exercising
that jurisdiction).
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jurisdictional questions that must be satisfactorily answered before the
court has the authority to adjudicate the claim.90
By contrast, the remaining statutory sections that comprise the
FTCA are located in a separate chapter of the Judicial Code, namely
Chapter 171 which is designated “Tort Claims Procedure.” By virtue of
being classified in a non-jurisdictional chapter, and even more
specifically in a chapter that is reserved for standards and rules of
“procedure,” these additional statutory provisions presumably should
not be given a jurisdictional construction. Thus, while §§ 2671 through
2680 of the FTCA91 set forth additional standards, prerequisites,
directions, and exceptions which are enforceable expressions of
legislative intent, the presence or absence of these elements generally
does not have a jurisdictional effect so as to deprive the court of any
authority to proceed. If the parties should stipulate to or waive
objections respecting these elements, the action could proceed without
the court being obliged to act sua sponte to ensure that each provision
was satisfied.
And, indeed, the courts appear to have arrived at just that conclusion
about the distribution of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional elements
in the FTCA, although without directly referencing the chapter structure
of the Judicial Code in doing so. Thus, for example, § 2674 of the
FTCA92 more specifically describes the standard of liability and adds
exclusions of governmental liability for “interest prior to judgment” and
“for punitive damages.” When the Supreme Court construed this
prohibition on awards of punitive damages in Molzof v. United States,93
it rejected the government’s suggestion of a special definition that
would limit governmental liability to strictly compensatory damages,
instead adopting the traditional common-law understanding of punitive
damages as that which is designed to punish a party for egregious
misconduct.94 In relying on ordinary principles of statutory
construction, rather than applying the kind of strict and jurisdictional
construction often applied to the core of a statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity,95 the Court rejected the government’s “restrictive reading of
the statute.”96 In fact, after quoting the punitive damages limitation as

90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
91. Id. §§ 2671–80.
92. Id. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages.”).
93. 502 U.S. 301 (1992).
94. Id. at 304–12.
95. See Sisk, supra note 49, at 562–66.
96. Molzof, 502 U.S. at 310.
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found in § 2674, the Court referred to the “jurisdictional grant over
FTCA cases” as being separately found in § 1346(b).97
Similarly, with respect to the exceptions to liability under the FTCA
found in § 2680,98 in Indian Towing Co. v. United States99 and Block v.
Neal,100 the Supreme Court noted the government’s concessions that the
discretionary function exception101 did not apply in these cases—
waivers the Court did not question as it would have been obliged to do
sua sponte were it a jurisdictional element.
In the recent Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service decision,102 the Court
explained that it was inclined to construe exceptions to the waiver more
narrowly, so as not to defeat the sweeping purpose of the FTCA in
waiving sovereign immunity.103 If these standards, restrictions, or
exceptions were instead jurisdictional limitations, the presumption
would be in the other direction, as the burden lies with the party seeking
to invoke the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.104
For comparative purposes, special attention should be drawn to the
statute of limitations governing FTCA claims. The limitations period is
not established through the general section waiving sovereign immunity
and simultaneously conferring district court jurisdiction105 nor in any
other section classified in a jurisdictional chapter of the Judicial Code.
Rather, § 2401(b)106 is located in Chapter 161 of Title 28, which is
headed “United States as Party Generally.” In language with significant
parallels to the statute of limitations for non-tort money claims in the
United States Court of Federal Claims,107 Subsection 2401(b) provides:

97. Id. at 305.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
99. 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955).
100. 460 U.S. 289, 294 (1983).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
102. 546 U.S. 481 (2006).
103. Id. at 491–92; see also United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)
(saying that the Court has “narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity
where that was consistent with Congress’ clear intent, as in the context of the ‘sweeping
language’ of the Federal Tort Claims Act”).
104. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942) (“[I]f a plaintiff’s allegations of
jurisdictional facts are challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of supporting
the allegations by competent proof.”); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108
(1941) (“[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal
courts is one calling for the strict construction of [the statute allowing removal of cases from
state to federal court].”); Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883) (“[T]he
presumption is that a cause [brought in federal court] is without its jurisdiction unless the
contrary affirmatively appears.”).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
106. Id. § 2401(b).
107. Id. § 2501; see supra Part III.A.
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A tort claim against the United States shall be forever
barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate
Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or
unless action is begun within six months after . . . notice of
final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.108
Although previously describing this FTCA statute of limitations as a
“condition of [the] waiver” of sovereign immunity,109 the Supreme
Court has never characterized it as jurisdictional nor addressed the
question of whether it is subject to equitable tolling. Reasoning that the
FTCA contains “a garden variety limitations provision,”110 nearly every
court of appeals to address the question has concluded or suggested that
the FTCA provision falls within the presumption of Irwin v. Department
of Veterans Affairs111 that statutes of limitations in federal government
cases are subject to equitable tolling.112 As “[t]he sine qua non of a
jurisdictional rule is a demand for strict and nonwaivable compliance
with its terms,”113 whatever label the courts might apply to the
provision, a holding that the FTCA statute of limitations may be
equitably adjusted confirms its non-jurisdictional nature.114
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
109. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979).
110. Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999).
111. 498 U.S. 89, 94–95 (1990).
112. See, e.g., T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 2006);
Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2006); Hughes v. United States, 263 F.3d
272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001); Perez, 167 F.3d at 917; Glarner v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Admin., 30
F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994); Pipkin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274–75 (10th Cir.
1991); see also Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that strict
compliance with FTCA statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional prerequisite). But see Marley
v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding, with reliance on John R.
Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130 (2008), that the FTCA statute of limitations is jurisdictional
and that the doctrines of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling do not apply); Wukawitz v.
United States, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Utah 2001) (holding that Congress did not intend
to permit equitable tolling of the FTCA statute of limitations); Ugo Colella & Adam Bain,
Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Putting the Legislative History in
Proper Perspective, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 174 (2000) (arguing that the legislative history of
the FTCA indicates Congress did not intend the statute of limitations to be subject to equitable
exceptions); Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort
Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (1999) (same).
113. Sisk, supra note 49, at 554.
114. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (holding that “the timely filing of a
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement,” meaning that the “Court has no
authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”); Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (noting that “filing a timely charge of discrimination
with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that,
like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”); Scott Dodson,
In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 60 (2008) (“Defects in subject matter
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None of the court decisions declining to confer jurisdictional
significance or effect on the substantive standards, the exceptions to
liability, and the statute of limitations to the FTCA has expressly cited
the placement of these provisions in non-jurisdictional chapters of Title
28. Yet, recalling the Supreme Court’s drawing of the jurisdictional
line through the six elements found in the one statutory section that is
classified in a jurisdictional chapter and appreciating the court rulings
that decline to categorize as jurisdictional the various other statutory
provisions which are not codified in a jurisdictional chapter, the results
rather neatly track the framework of Title 28. This may simply be a
coincidence, or it may be adequately explained by the clear use of
jurisdictional language in § 1346(b) and the absence of such language in
other FTCA sections. Still, one might be forgiven for suspecting that
some judges may have peeked at the structure of the Judicial Code in
making decisions classifying the basic nature of these statutory
provisions.
In any event, the very same arguments based upon both language
and structure should apply with full force to the statute of limitations for
non-tort money claims against the federal government that are brought
in the Court of Federal Claims.115 Instead, giving rise to an anomaly in
the law and disharmony with code structure, similarly worded statutes
of limitations that are both codified in non-jurisdictional chapters have
been given contradictory readings. This disparate treatment could and
should be avoided by encouraging the courts in every case to give heed
to the structure of the Judicial Code.
IV. SUBVERTING FAITHFUL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTORY LAW
On at least some occasions, the courts appear to have heard and
heeded the call of § 33 to ignore the structure of the Judicial Code.116
Still, might there be a plausible basis for urging the courts instead to
ignore § 33? Or, more in keeping with the principle of judicial
candor,117 might the courts have a legitimate basis for forthrightly
refusing to listen to § 33? If § 33 either fails to clearly limit the
judiciary’s choices among the available tools of statutory construction
or improperly constrains the courts or the legislature in performance of
their constitutional responsibilities, then it may be nullified without the
need for affirmative legislative annulment.

jurisdiction cannot be forfeited, waived, or consented to; they are not subject to principles of
estoppel; and they can be raised at any time and by any party, including a court sua sponte.”).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006); see also supra Part III.A.
116. See supra Part III.
117. See infra note 164.
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First, § 33 of the 1948 Act instructs the reader that “[n]o inference of
a legislative construction is to be drawn” by reason of the chapters and
catchlines that form the framework of the Judicial Code.118 An
ingenious exponent might insist that this interpretive directive is without
functional efficacy because it aims at the wrong target, that is, it speaks
to an assessment of legislative intent rather than a judicial interpretation
of the authoritative text. Taking literally its prohibition of reliance on
structure as a basis for drawing an “inference of legislative
construction,” § 33 arguably fails to circumscribe the textualist judge
who focuses upon the language enacted by Congress and has no interest
in divining the underlying legislative intent.119 As the nation’s most
prominent textualist jurist, Justice Antonin Scalia, puts it, the judge
should decide “on the basis of what the legislature said,” rather than “on
the basis of what [the legislature] meant.”120 In the instance of the
Judicial Code, what Congress “said” is to be found in both the phrasing
of individual statutory sections and the wording of parts and chapters
and catchlines. In sum, because a textualist jurist draws no “inference of
legislative construction” whatsoever, the argument could be made that
§ 33’s attempt to regulate how judges ascertain legislative intent is a
misdirected nullity.121
But this dismissal of § 33 as an empty gesture might fairly be
characterized as too clever by half. Precisely because such a reading of
§ 33 would deprive language enacted by Congress of having any
consequence, the textualist judge who sidestepped this provision
arguably would contradict his or her own text-focused theory of
judging. As William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett
ask, “[i]f the statutory text tells the judge to follow legislative intent,
what is the textualist to do?”122 And, of course, a judge who did not
strictly adhere to a textualist approach to statutory interpretation would
not blanch at the statutory reference to “legislative construction” (even
118. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991.
119. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (1997) (arguing that the judge should
focus upon the text of the statute—“what the lawgiver promulgated”—rather than seek to give
effect to the intent of the legislature—“what the lawgiver meant”); John F. Manning, Textualism
as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684 (1997) (citing Max Radin’s
“compelling indictment of legislative intent” as a basis for statutory interpretation, including the
argument that “a search for legislative intent is futile”).
120. Scalia, supra note 119, at 18.
121. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 955 (4th ed. 2007)
(posing the question of how a judicial textualist, such as Justice Scalia, should respond to
interpretive directives that contradict the textualist premises for appropriate interpretation of a
statute).
122. Id.
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if that judge found this particular directive to be disquieting for other
reasons).
Moreover, despite the quaint parlance of “inference of legislative
construction,” the meaning of § 33 is clear in forbidding interpretive
reliance upon the structure and labeling of the Judicial Code. Thus,
whatever the respective merits of a textualist versus an intentionlist (or
other) approach to statutory interpretation in general, this particular
interpretive directive can be implemented, if awkwardly for other
reasons, without engaging in any subjective inquiry into legislative
intent.
Second, the discomfort that a judge might experience in obeying a
statutory directive that demands deliberate disregard for a visible part of
the legislative product could be the symptom of other and more
fundamental infirmities in § 33. Does § 33 trespass on the constitutional
responsibilities of the Judicial Branch in faithful interpretation of
statutory law or interfere with the constitutional prerogatives of the
Legislative Branch in exercising its powers without being regulated by
the dead hand of prior legislative actors?
The traditional and majority view among scholars is that “Congress
has the constitutional power to adopt interpretive instructions for courts’
use in interpretation.”123 In a comprehensive analysis of the question,
Nicholas Rosenkranz concludes that, with exceptions where a particular
provision overrides constitutional default rules demanding a clear
legislative statement or prospectively delegates legislative power to
define statutory terms, “[m]ost of the interpretive decisions courts
make—whether choosing a dictionary, referencing a canon, or spurning
pre-enactment legislative history—may be regulated by Congress.”124
Indeed, Rosenkranz opines that the legislative power to issue
instructions to the courts on how to interpret statutes “is an
exceptionally potent one.”125
123. Adam W. Kiracofe, Note, The Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response
and Proposal to Nicholas Rosenkranz’s Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 571, 591 (2004); see also 1A SINGER, supra note 32, § 27:4, at 473 (“There should be no
question that an interpretive clause operating prospectively is within legislative power.”);
Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the
Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438, 448 (1950) (“Any serious suggestion at this day that since
interpretation is a judicial function a general interpretive act, applicable only to future statutes,
would be unconstitutional, could hardly be taken seriously.”).
124. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2140 (2002); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System
of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1502 (2000) (“Congress makes the laws that the
courts must apply, and it is appropriate for Congress, as for any giver of binding instructions, to
give instructions about how those who must carry out the instructions should understand them.”)
(footnote omitted).
125. Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 2140.
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But other scholarly voices have been raised in dissent against the
conventional wisdom. Drawing upon Marbury v. Madison’s venerable
principle that it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,”126 these scholars argue that “[t]he legislature has
the power to make the laws, while the judiciary declares what those
laws mean.”127 Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash contend that
“[b]ecause the lodestar of statutory interpretation is the discernment of
the statute’s meaning, binding rules of interpretation of whatever sort
must be ignored when an interpreter decides that the meaning of a
statute differs from the constructed ‘meaning’ derived from the
application of binding rules of construction.”128 Linda Jellum concludes
that, while “[t]he legislature may legitimately try to influence the
interpretive outcome to promote specific policy choices,” the
Legislative Branch would violate separation of powers principles by
“attempting to control the interpretive process.”129 In particular, Jellum
argues that an interpretive directive crosses the constitutional line and
invades the judicial territory when it seeks to “identify what evidence a
court may consider when interpreting statutes”130 (a negative conclusion
that presumably would encompass a directive that the judiciary may not
consider the “evidence” of code structure when giving meaning to a
statutory section).131
In addition to creating a potential collision with the judiciary’s duty
of faithful interpretation of statutes, the binding effect of prospective
interpretive rules on future Congresses may invalidly constrict the free
exercise of the constitutional legislative power. Laurence Tribe argues
that Congress may not limit the effect of statutes enacted in the future or
require future Congresses to use certain language to accomplish a
legislative purpose.132 Relying “upon the limiting provisions” of such
statutes “restrictively to construe a statute that other interpretive indicia,

126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
127. Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211,
221 (1994).
128. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMM. 97, 99–100 (2003).
129. Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 840 (2009).
130. Id. at 882.
131. See id. at 849 (listing “components” of a statute, including “titles,” as falling into the
“intrinsic” category of sources of meaning for statutes).
132. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2–3, at 125–26 n.1 (3d ed.
2000); see also Alexander & Prakash, supra note 128, at 105 (“Congress may not force a future
Congress to use particular language to legislate. If a meaning emerges from a statute, that
meaning must control, rather than some artificial meaning that emerges from an inflexible
adherence to rule of interpretation promulgated by a prior Congress.”).
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taken as a whole, suggest is best read” to mean something different,
Tribe argues, “would seem to raise serious constitutional questions.”133
As most of the constitutional objections to statutory interpretive
directions have focused on those that operate prospectively and thus
purport to dictate the meaning of statutes enacted by future Congresses,
even some scholars raising constitutional questions concede that
“Congress could enact mandatory rules of interpretation that are to
apply to the very act which created the mandatory rules of
interpretation.”134 However, an interpretive directive that is attached to
the codification of a title of the United States Code, which will be the
subject of dynamic ongoing modification across the decades,135 is
difficult to classify into a single retrospective or prospective category.
More pointedly, § 33 is not a typical interpretive directive that
forthrightly defines a term, establishes a presumption, or sets out a tiebreaking rule of construction to be used when the text of the underlying
statute fails to provide a clear answer in a particular case. As Alan
Romero reports, “[v]irtually all interpretive directions apply only when
a statute is ambiguous and needs to be interpreted.”136 The defense of
interpretive instructions against the argument that they “impinge on the
federal judiciary’s interpretive power” is most trenchant when such
provisions are understood as “designed solely to clarify potential
ambiguities in the law.”137 Section 33, however, does not modestly
certify a particular canon of interpretation to be employed when the text
is ambiguous. Rather, § 33 commands the courts to elide part of the
statutory text itself.
In 1948, when Congress passed Title 28 into positive law, it
promulgated not only the wording of each individual provision but also
133. 1 TRIBE, supra note 132, at 125. But see Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 2117–18
(saying the “simple answer” to Tribe’s objection is that a rule of statutory construction does not
add to the constitutional requirements for a future Congress to enact legislation “because the
rule itself may be suspended or repealed by an act that comports with Article I, Section 7”);
Siegel, supra note 124, at 1504 n.235 (arguing that “the legislature, in passing any statute, may
always exclude it from the operation of any previously passed interpretive statute,” so an
interpretative statute does “not really detract from the legislature’s power”).
134. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 128, at 98 n.2.
135. On the frequency of amendments by Congress to Title 28, see infra note 164–65 and
accompanying text.
136. Romero, supra note 127, at 228; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170,
183–84 (1993) (holding that the interpretive clause directing that the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) be given a “liberal construction” does not substitute for “the
normal means of interpretation” but “only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)); Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the
Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 245 (1996) (explaining generally that “the plain meaning of the statute
provides a check on the use of [interpretive] canon[s]” by the courts).
137. See Kiracofe, supra note 123, at 596.
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the designated parts, chapters, and subchapters into which those
provisions were located.138 The visible body of the Judicial Code is not
something outside of the text but rather is composed of a lexical spine to
which every section of Title 28 is joined. The arrangement of parts,
chapters, and subchapters is marked by black lettering and is carried out
by words, no less than the content of the particular statutory sections
that are assembled within that textual architecture. Thus, strictly
speaking, judicial attention to the structure of the Judicial Code does not
involve the mere application of a canon of construction but rather is part
and parcel of the primary interpretive focus upon the text itself.139
Now Congress certainly could codify a title of the United States
Code without arranging sections within parts, chapters, and subchapters,
and eschewing any catchline appellation, which plainly would preclude
any interpretive exercise based upon structure. That Congress
theoretically could enact a code as a hodgepodge of provisions
assembled at random, however, is no answer to the straightforward
observation that Congress did something quite different with the
revision and codification of Title 28. Nonetheless, one still might
suggest, Congress surely could codify a statutory title that was
structured in a particular manner for the convenience of the legislators
during their consideration, while directing that this framework was not
to be enacted into law. Indeed, § 33 might be defended as simply
accomplishing that modest purpose of demoting the structure of the
Judicial Code to something less than the force of law.
But, again, the constitutionally-salient fact remains that Congress
chose to instantiate the structure of the Judicial Code into the law when
codifying Title 28. The 1948 legislation that enacted Title 28 into
positive law—the act which “passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate” and was “presented to the President of the United States”
pursuant to Article I, § 7 of the Constitution140—consisted of a Judicial
Code that was divided into parts, chapters, and subchapters and that
bore headings for divisions and sections.141 Thus, within the meaning of
Article I, § 7, the whole of Title 28, including its lexical structure,
became “a Law.”142 The constitutional question then becomes whether
Congress may extract a promise from the judiciary to avert the juridical
eye from part of the completed legislative action.

138. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869.
139. See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 644–45 (1990) (explaining that
“basic principles of statutory construction . . . require giving effect to the meaning and
placement of the words chosen by Congress” (emphasis added)).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
141. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869.
142. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (declaring the legislative actions that create “a Law”).
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To again quote Justice Scalia, “[t]he text is the law, and it is the text
that must be observed.”143 Even assuming the general constitutional
validity of statutory interpretive directions, no regulation of the courts
may “undermine the essential functions of the judiciary.”144 By
directing the interpreter to disregard part of the “Law,” § 33 may
simultaneously contribute to the constitutional delinquency of the
Legislative Branch by allowing it to disavow its own legislative act and
commit a constitutional trespass against the Judicial Branch by
interrupting the conscientious exercise of “[t]he judicial Power of the
United States.”145
Nor can an interpretive provision attached to an act of Congress
serve to undo what Congress through the main body of the same act has
manifestly done. If dissatisfied with the structure of a code, Congress
may subsequently repeal it, thereby erasing it from the United States
Code. Congress may not, however, simultaneously enact and repeal the
same line of text through a single legislative act, for such an internal
inconsistency would abrogate the very law-creating character of the act.
Even if such an oxymoron could qualify as a proper exercise of the
legislative power, § 33 does not purport to negate or withdraw any part
of the enactment. Rather, § 33 seeks to veil part of the legislative action
in darkness, with instructions to the courts not to shine a light on to
what Congress has done.
In the end, we return to the inescapable fact that Congress’s
organization and classification of statutory provisions into designated
parts and chapters within a newly-codified Title 28 was anything but
accidental. As discussed previously and as is further emphasized below,
the Title 28 revisers in drafting the revision and codification and the
Congress in then enacting the legislation did not regard the structure of
the Judicial Code as merely ornamental and without substantive import
for the public.146 Quite to the contrary, the coherent and organized
treatment of jurisdiction, venue, removal of causes, full faith and credit,
and evidence and procedure were proudly highlighted as among the
great successes of the revision. And, again, when Congress took final
action on the legislation to revise and codify Title 28, it did not leave
behind the structure of the Judicial Code, as mere scaffolding to be
broken down after construction, but rather cemented the entire
integrated compilation into positive law.

143. Scalia, supra note 119, at 22.
144. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676,
728 (2007).
145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
146. See supra notes 21, 27–31 and accompanying text, and infra notes 152, 173–75 and
accompanying text.
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In any event, the maladroit “inference of legislative construction”
language in § 33 and the constitutional dubiety of a legislative attempt
to blind the eyes of the judiciary to a central element of what Congress
has enacted should prompt us to question the wisdom of the provision
as a matter of policy. Whatever the constitutional strengths or defects of
interpretive directives generally or this provision specifically, scholars
agree that Congress always remains free to unburden itself of a prior
directive that it concludes no longer serves the public interest.147
Textually ambiguous or not, constitutionally valid or not, § 33 should be
repealed.148
V. MAKING THE CASE FOR REPEAL OF LEGISLATION THAT BLINDS
THE COURTS TO STRUCTURAL REALITY
Section 33 of the 1948 revision and codification of Title 28 instructs
the courts to ignore what a simple reading of the table of contents to the
Judicial Code makes readily apparent.149 By denying that any meaning
may be attached to the structure of the Code, § 33 not only withdraws
an important tool of statutory construction from the judiciary’s tool-box,
but undermines the rule of law by blinding the judiciary to the blackand-white format of Title 28, as enacted into positive law.150
Whatever uneasiness Congress may have harbored in 1948 that
caused it to divert judicial attention from the very structural revisions
Congress was enacting Title 28 to produce,151 there is no apparent
contemporary reason to preserve the false directive of § 33. For at least
two reasons, this pernicious provision should be repealed.
First, § 33 is dishonest legislation, or at least misleading, because it
surreptitiously rewrites Title 28 of the United States Code to erase the
palpable organization that is manifest to any reader. Judge Albert Maris
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, who had
been appointed by Chief Justice Stone to chair the committee of the
Judicial Conference working with Congress on the Title 28 revision,
observed later that same year after the 1948 enactment:
A glance at the new Act will demonstrate that the revisers
147. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 132, § 2-3, at 125 (“[T]he power of Congress legislatively to
bind subsequent Congresses is limited, for any statute that purported to direct or to forbid
subsequent Congresses to do certain things or to follow certain procedures could be repealed, as
could any other law, by another duly enacted statute.”); Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 2120
(arguing that the answer to any objections about the constitutional validity of statutory
interpretive directions is that a current Congress always may exercise the legislative power to
repeal the acts of prior Congresses).
148. See infra Part V.
149. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991.
150. See also supra Part IV.
151. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text.
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have been particularly successful in arranging, in a logical
and consistent way, the statutory material which remains in
force. The law has been made easily accessible, not only to
the lawyer, but to the layman as well.152
While a “glance” at Title 28 does indeed demonstrate a “logical and
consistent” arrangement of the statutory material, § 33 cloaks the
brightly-lit profile observed by both the lawyer and layman in
jurisprudential darkness.
In this respect, § 33 foments a paradoxical form of artifice, because
it effectively declares that the visible structure of Title 28 is only an
illusion and is without meaning, while the classification of statutory
provisions into sections that are collected with related provisions into
carefully designed and described chapters remains immediately and
obviously apparent to any reader of the legal text. In truth, and
notwithstanding § 33, this comprehensive statutory framework was
painstakingly and deliberately constructed by the 1948 code revisers
and was then enacted by Congress as positive law, as the previous
discussion confirms.153 Thus, with one legislative action (the enactment
of Title 28 with a plain and visible structure), Congress says one thing,
but with another (the veiling directive of § 33), Congress says another.
Especially because it is an uncodified provision, § 33 is likely to be
overlooked even by a reasonably diligent legal researcher. Of the many
scholars in the fields of federal courts and civil procedure who reviewed
a draft of this Article or with whom I have discussed this matter, most
of whom have an encyclopedic knowledge of the Judicial Code, nearly
all acknowledged that they too had not previously known of the
existence of § 33. Despite toiling in the vineyard of the Judicial Code
for twenty years as a practitioner, teacher, and scholar, when I began
work on the opening brief for the petitioner before the Supreme Court
in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,154 I failed to discover
this codicil to the 1948 revision until my co-counsel, Jeffrey Haynes,
brought to our attention the results of his diligent research.
Both to avoid being embarrassed by having failed to mention this
uncodified provision, should the government’s counsel uncover it and
invoke it in the respondent’s brief, and because we were ethically
obliged to bring mandatory authority to the attention of the Supreme
Court,155 we forthrightly surfaced § 33 in our brief. In so doing, we
152. Maris, supra note 27, at 864; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 1–2 (1948) (“The
statutory material presently in force has been arranged in the bill in a logical and consistent way,
rendering it easily ascertainable.”).
153. See supra Parts III & IV.
154. See supra Part III.A.
155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002) (saying the lawyer “shall
not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

486

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

realized that § 33 unavoidably withdrew some of the persuasive power
from our structural argument and forced us to frame this point as a
species of a textual argument based on comparison of the differing
language of statutory sections in different chapters of Title 28. My
guess is that most advocates would have overlooked § 33 and made the
structural argument without qualification, either improperly or to their
chagrin when opposing counsel or the Court adduced it.
In sum, § 33 sets up the very kind of pitfall for the unwary that the
code revisers intended to eliminate through their studious reorganization of the judicial code in Title 28.156
Given the heavy reliance by the public on the United States Code (as
found in every law library and every computer database),157 an
uncodified statutory section left out of a finished title may be the
modern equivalent of what Justice Scalia describes as “one of emperor
Nero’s nasty practices,” which was “to post his edicts high on the
columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to
transgress.”158 Lon Fuller contended that secret law so contradicts the
internal morality of the law as to not truly count as law at all.159
To be sure, directed as it is to the judiciary in its interpretive task,
§ 33 does not bring about the direct injustice of punishing a person for
failing to obey a secret law, because no ordinary citizen obeys a rule or
canon of statutory construction. Nonetheless, as outlined previously, the

known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel”).
156. See infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
157. See Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600
and H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 20 (1947)
(statement of Judge Albert Maris, then chairman of the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on
the Revision of the Laws who oversaw codification of Title 28) (explaining that the United
States Code “is a tool that is very useful, and it is widely used, not only by judges, but by
lawyers and by the public,” and therefore codification of Title 28 as positive law with “all the
laws grouped appropriately” is vitally important so that the public may rely upon this title of the
United States Code).
158. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989). I do not mean to suggest that every uncodified statutory provision is an offense against
the principle of open and honest government. Most uncodified provisions enacted as part of new
legislation are innocuous or auxiliary clauses that are operative primarily for a short period after
enactment when attention is still drawn to the original legislative act, such as provisions stating
the effective date, setting out transitional rules, requiring studies or reports by government
agencies, or providing for severance of invalidated parts of the statute so that other parts remain
in effect. By contrast, § 33 is everlasting in effect on interpretation of Title 28, both as originally
codified and as regularly amended. Furthermore, in contrast with typical uncodified provisions,
§ 33 contradicts, rather than facilitates, the positive effect of the legislation.
159. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964) (“Certainly there can be no rational
ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that . . . is kept
secret from him . . . .”).
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vagaries that it produces in results is a matter of justice denied.160 Nor is
§ 33 secret in the most formal sense, as it is part of the public laws—
though few would know to look for it outside of the supposedly
comprehensive Judicial Code. But Congress revised and codified Title
28 in 1948 precisely because “the public is entitled primarily to know
what the laws of its country are, and . . . to have those laws presented to
it in the clearest, most concise and most understandable form.”161
Section 33 contradicts that congressional guarantee of transparency and
open government.
Second, § 33 is a continuing obstacle to faithful interpretation by the
courts of the statutory provisions codified in Title 28 of the United
States Code.162 Pretending that there is no structure to Title 28, as § 33
demands, does not spare the courts from having to classify statutory
provisions according to their nature. Instead, it forces the courts to
undertake that classification work in a less than fully-informed (or fullytransparent) manner. Indeed, given human nature, judges having to
ascertain the character of a provision are likely to be influenced by the
evidence before their own eyes—as they can plainly see the section,
sub-chapter, chapter, and part structure laid out in Title 28—even if
those judges are obliged by the directive of § 33 to pretend otherwise.163
This is no way to run the enterprise of statutory construction or ensure
judicial sincerity in offering genuine public reasons for decisions.164
Because § 33 has permanent interpretive force, reaching out across
the decades, Congress is well justified in removing its continuing
mischievous effects. Repealing § 33 shows no unseemly disregard for
the legislative intent of a past Congress, for this uncodified directive is
not confined in application to the legislative actions of the past. As a
brief perusal of the notes in the United States Code Annotated quickly
reveals, Congress has amended Title 28 on dozens of occasions since
1948, acting on a nearly annual basis to incorporate new language or
160. See supra Part III.
161. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and
H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 10 (1947)
(statement of Rep. Keogh, Chairman of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws).
162. See supra Part IV.
163. See supra Part III.B.
164. See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 988 (2008) (“Since it
is usually wrong to deceive others, judges should be truthful about the reasons for their
decisions.”); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737
(1987) (arguing that requiring judges to provide candid reasons for their decisions “serves a vital
function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power” and that a lack of candor “serves to
increase the level of cynicism about the nature of judging and of judges”); see also Laura E.
Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46
UCLA L. REV. 75, 140 (1998) (arguing that judicial candor is especially important in
jurisdictional rulings because “clarity is particularly welcome in this field [of federal court
jurisdiction] given the plethora of other roadblocks to understanding”).
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new sections into the part, chapter, and subchapter structure of the
Judicial Code.
Surely it is not likely that the average member of Congress is any
more aware of this uncodified blinding instruction than the average
judge, lawyer, or federal courts scholar. Thus, our federal legislative
representatives almost certainly are regularly asked to vote on revisions
and additions to the visible framework of the Judicial Code under the
mistaken impression that legislative choices to locate provisions within
that structure means something. Thus, as discussed previously,165
Congress itself has been blinded by § 33, without even being aware that
its legislative arrows may fail to reach a partially hidden target.
VI. STRUCTURAL CONTEXT AS A REINVIGORATED TOOL TO
CONSTRUCTION OF THE JUDICIAL CODE
Finally, a few words are in order about how interpretation of Title 28
might look in the brighter light that would come with the dawn of a new
day after repeal of § 33. While attention to structure would bring about
some changes—among other things clarifying that some statutory
provisions do or do not have a jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional
character and bringing about consistent treatment of similarly-worded
and codified provisions—dramatic changes need not be feared.
To say that an inference of legislative construction may be drawn by
reason of the location of a statute in a designated part or chapter having
a distinct caption would not be to say that any particular inference must
be drawn in every case, much less that other compelling evidence of
statutory meaning would be neglected. In United States v. Fisher,166 the
two-hundred-year-old decision quoted at the beginning of this Article,
Chief Justice Marshall agreed that the name of a legislative act cannot
“controul plain words in the body of the statute.”167 Nonetheless, he
explained, when ambiguity is present, “the title claims a degree of
notice, and will have its due share of consideration.”168
Even more directly on point with respect to the importance of
location of a section within a statutory structure is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,
Inc.,169 from the 2007 Term. In concluding that the transfer of an asset
by a debtor in bankruptcy is eligible for a statutory exemption from a
stamp tax only when transferred after confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan
by the bankruptcy court, the Court found “it informative that Congress
placed [the statutory section providing for an exemption from the tax] in
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra Part IV.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358 (1805).
Id. at 386.
Id.
128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008).
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a subchapter entitled, ‘POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS.’”170 The
Court acknowledged that “a subchapter heading cannot substitute for
the operative text of the statute,” but emphasized that titles and headings
“‘are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a
statute.’”171 The Court then reiterated that “[t]he placement of [the tax
exemption section] within a subchapter expressly limited to
postconfirmation matters undermines [the respondent’s] view that [the
section] covers preconfirmation transfers.”172
Repealing § 33 and fully restoring the vitality of contextual analysis
as part of the interpretive enterprise for the Judicial Code would not
mean that the answers are always foreordained. Identifying the part or
chapter in which a statutory provision is located may not yield the full
operative meaning of the language, especially as we move from the
basic classification of a statutory section to more detailed questions of
application of the statutory provision. Examining the statutory structure
serves as a tool to interpretation, not a talisman.
John F. X. Finn, former special counsel to the House Committee on
Revision of the Laws, testified at the 1947 legislative hearings on the
codification of Title 28 that he was “proudest of the way this proposed
code deals with jurisdiction, venue, removal of causes, full faith and
credit, and evidence and procedure.”173 Finn explained that while such
words as “jurisdiction” and “procedure” may be “but labels to the
layman,” “[t]o lawyers they are the pitfalls of litigation.”174 In
describing the work of the Title 28 revisers, Finn concluded that “[w]ise
judges and lawyers have objectively and dispassionately explored these
pitfalls and covered them with well-drawn statutes so that postwar
justice may be sure-footed, courageous, impartial, and serene.”175
It is on these categorizing questions about the basic nature of a
statutory provision that the classification features of Title 28 are most
likely to be edifying to judges interpreting the Judicial Code. The
organizational structure of Title 28 is less likely to shed light on the
precise meaning of a particular provision in application within its
category. But, similarly, that a roadmap does not also provide
information about the repair, maintenance, and operation of a vehicle of
transportation does not make the roadmap any less valuable for its
intended purpose.
170. Id. at 2336.
171. Id. (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002)).
172. Id.; see also United States v. Bowen, 100 U.S. 508, 513 (1879) (interpreting a statute
based on “the reasonable force of the language used in that section, taken in connection with the
whole of the chapter devoted to that subject, and the accepted canons of interpretation”).
173. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and
H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 44 (1947).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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As the Title 28 code revisers recognized, identifying a provision as
one of “jurisdiction” or “evidence” or “procedure” may make a
significant difference in terms of how that provision operates.176 As
discussed previously,177 whether a statutory provision is found to be
jurisdictional or procedural may have significant consequential effects,
such as whether the provision may be waived or forfeited or whether a
statute of limitations in a government-related case should be applied in
the same manner as in private litigation.
If a statutory provision is mistakenly characterized as jurisdictional
in nature, unfortunate consequences follow closely behind. The
determination of which issues deserve to be litigated (or instead may be
waived or forfeited) is taken out of the hands of the parties (both
claimants and the government).178 The party that prevails on the merits
may be deprived of victory by a belated jurisdictional ruling after trial.
When a provision is declared jurisdictional, the courts are “forced to
raise and answer new, sometimes difficult, and often fact-based issues
sua sponte.”179 As the recently departed David Currie lamented about
the duty of the courts to “investigat[e] the existence of jurisdiction on
their own and at any stage of the proceedings,” this is an “expensive
habit.”180
Moreover, while the categorization of a statutory section in a
jurisdictional or procedural chapter would be weighty evidence that it
has the same nature as the accompanying chapter catchline, a more
complete analysis of all the evidence bearing on interpretation may
rebut that presumption in exceptional cases. Even after a repeal of § 33,
some statutory provisions may be “jurisdictional even though expressed
in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants.”181
For example, although not placed into a jurisdictional chapter under
Title 28, the statutory requirement of a timely notice of appeal in a civil
case182 might remain a jurisdictional mandate.183 The traditional rule
had been that filing a timely notice of appeal is “an event of
jurisdictional significance” because “it confers jurisdiction on the court
176. See supra Parts II & V.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (“Waiver, consent,
and forfeiture allow the parties to designate which issues require court decision and which are of
such relative unimportance to the parties that they would rather forgo the costs of litigating
them.”).
179. Sisk, supra note 49, at 545.
180. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 268, 298 (1969).
181. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 n.6 (2003).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006).
183. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007) (holding that the timely filing of
a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement).
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of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects
of the case involved in the appeal.”184 Similarly, under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the prior filing of an administrative claim is an absolute
prerequisite to any judicial proceeding,185 even though that statutory
mandate is not located in a jurisdictional chapter.186 First, the explicit
and emphatic textual “command that an ‘action shall not be
instituted . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to
the appropriate Federal agency’”187 must be given full effect by the
courts. While structure conveys some evidence of a provision’s nature,
the express and specific language of a statutory section takes priority
over classification in a chapter or subchapter. Second, the prior
administrative filing direction might be given jurisdictional significance
to uphold the congressional intent to allow the agency to explore
settlement before the burdens of litigation are imposed on the courts and
the government and to satisfy the general principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.188
To be sure, restoring the proper place of structure in statutory
interpretation might provoke a judicial reexamination of the
jurisdictional assumptions made with respect to such matters as the time
for filing a civil notice of appeal or the priority of an administrative
claim for seeking tort damages against the federal government. And
such a reconsideration might well be a salutary development, leading to
a loosening of the strictures of jurisdictional absolutes while not altering
basic procedural expectations in the general run of cases. Even if these
jurisdictional holdings by the courts were overturned after consideration
of the structure of the Judicial Code, the courts likely would conclude
that a timely notice of appeal and prior resort to administrative remedies
remained mandatory statutory requirements whenever a party properly
raised the issue.189 As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written, “[t]he law
is full of rules that are mandatory in the sense that courts must enforce
them punctiliously if a litigant insists. Rules are not jurisdictional,
however, no matter how unyielding they may be, unless they set limits
184. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam); see
also Philip A. Pucillo, Jurisdictional Prescriptions, Nonjurisdictional Processing Rules, and
Federal Appellate Practice: The Implications of Kontrick, Eberhart & Bowles, 59 RUTGERS L.
REV. 847, 874 (2007) (referring to “the Court’s traditional understanding that the requirements
for the filing of a timely notice of appeal in a civil case are jurisdictional prerequisites”).
185. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110–12 (1993).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2006).
187. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675).
188. Id. at 111.
189. See Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 643–47
(2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court mistakenly characterized the time limit to file a civil
notice of appeal as jurisdictional and instead should have treated the appeal time as mandatory,
thus not susceptible to equitable adjustment but subject to waiver by the parties).
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on the federal courts’ adjudicatory competence.”190 Only if the parties
waived or forfeited objections to defects in procedural rules, or
powerful equitable bases existed for adjusting them in compelling cases,
could non-jurisdictional statutory requirements be set aside.
In sum, repeal of § 33 would not prescribe outcomes to every
question of interpretation. Rather, removing the legislative directive for
judicial blindness would allow for a healthy construction by the courts
of a statutory text in full contemplation of all canons and elements,
including textual context within a statutory scheme and code.
VII. CONCLUSION
The standard treatise on statutory construction states that “[b]ecause
a code represents and contains a systematic arrangement of laws, the
position in which a provision appears in an enacted code has greater
weight for purposes of interpretation than the position of a provision in
a regular act.”191 When it comes to Title 28 of the United States Code,
however, Congress’s uncodified § 33 mandates exactly the opposite—
that the deliberate structure of the Judicial Code be given no weight at
all for purposes of interpretation.
Repealing § 33 would allow judges to forthrightly consider the
structure of Title 28 as objective evidence of congressional intent with
respect to the Judicial Code. Congress thereby would send the clear
signal that the structure of Title 28—including the meaningful
categories of jurisdictional grants, chapters of procedural rules, etc.—is
and should be common grist for the interpretive mill. Allowing the
consideration of structure when interpreting the Judicial Code will lift
the blindfold from Lady Justice so that the contours of the law may be
fully revealed.

190. Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2007); see also
Dodson, supra note 178, at 9–11.
191. 1A SINGER, supra note 32, § 28:11, at 494.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/4

36

